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STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee/Respondent. 
Case No. 20050701-CA 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(j) (West 2004). Cramer 
appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of aggravated 
sexual abuse of a child, both first-degree felonies (R. 536-37). He appealed to the Utah Supreme 
Court, the supreme court poured the case over to this Court. 
ISSUE STATEMENTS AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. May Cramer raise his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims for the first time 
in post-conviction even though he could have, but did not raise those claims on direct appeal? 
2. Did Cramer prove that his appellate counsel were ineffective because they did not 
seek reversal based on his failure to testify at trial? 
3. Did Cramer prove prejudice from his appellate counsel's failure to supplement the 
direct-appeal record with his victim's mental health records where he did not include those 
records in the post-conviction proceedings, no record exists of what those records contain, and 
the trial court previously reviewed them and concluded that they contained no evidence material 
to Cramer's defense? 
4. Did Cramer prove that appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge trial 
counsel's investigation and use of witnesses and documents? 
5. Did Cramer prove cumulative prejudice where the case that he claims his trial counsel 
should have presented would have resulted in the jury learning that he previously pleaded guilty 
to two counts of lewdness with two other young boys under circumstances similar to those 
which the victim in this case described? 
This Court reviews the post-conviction court's legal conclusions for correctness and 
factual findings for clear error. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah), cert denied, 513 U.S. 
966 (1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 




Cramer applied to become a court appointed special advocate ("CASA") to assist the 
Office of the Guardian Ad Litem in working with abused or neglected children who have 
Cramer's fact and case statements contain several legal assertions. For example, he 
repeatedly avers that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. The State will address 
only the legal arguments contained in Cramer's Argument section. 
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pending juvenile court proceedings. A CASA volunteer is assigned to contact a child and report 
to the guardian ad litem ("GAL") on the child's general welfare, school progress, and other 
"basic factual information." (R. 724 at 121-25, 126.) 
Cramer believed he had "special expertise" in dealing with young boys because he 
worked for the Boy Scouts of America. Cramer requested an assignment as a CASA for young 
boys. (Id at 124-25.) 
On October 21,1996, Cramer was assigned as M.L.'s CASA. M.L. was seven years-old 
and was in residential treatment at the University of Utah Neuropsychiatric Institute ("UNI"). 
(Id. at 159, 125, 128-29.) 
As a CASA volunteer, Cramer was expected to contact M.L. at least four times a month, 
twice in person and twice by phone. As required by CASA procedures, Cramer kept a log of 
visits and activities with M.L. According to Cramer's logs, he sometimes saw M.L. four or five 
days in a row and on some of those days more than once. Cramer spent "an extraordinary 
amount of time" with M.L., compared to the amount of time other CASA volunteers spend with 
their charges. (Id at 125-38.) 
Cramer recorded that, among other things, he hugged and tickled M.L., tucked him into 
bed, and told M.L. that he was M.L.'s "special friend," and "like his dad." In addition to various 
other activities, Cramer recorded that he took M.L. swimming at least six times. Cramer 
reported in his log that, after one of the swimming excursions, he and M.L. discussed the 
anatomical differences between boys and girls. (Id. at 129,131-32,134-36,138.) 
In January 1997, while still in residential treatment at UNI, M.L. first met his future 
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adoptive parents. M.L. began living with his adoptive parents in March 1997. (Id. at 149-50.) 
Cramer twice visited M.L. after M.L. began living with his adoptive parents. During the 
second visit, Cramer again took M.L. swimming. (Id. at 151-53.) 
The night following Cramer's second visit, and for the first time since he had been living 
with his adoptive parents, M.L. wet his bed and continued to do so three to four times a week 
over a one-month period. M.L. also began masturbating. (Id. at 152-53, 155, 160.) 
On August 8,1997, M.L.'s adoptive mother brought M.L. to the Children's Justice Center 
in Salt Lake City because she had "a feeling . . . that something wasn't right." Detective Alex 
Huggard of the Murray City Police Department interviewed M.L. During that interview and on 
direct questioning, M.L. denied that Cramer had sexually abused him. (Id. at 155, 160, 163; R. 
725 at 238-39.) 
In early March 1998, M.L. had been living with his adoptive family for a year. Based on 
his adoptive father's assurances that everything would be fine, M.L. disclosed to his parents that 
Cramer sexually abused him. (EL 724 at 149-50; R. 725 at 157,197-98.) 
On March 6,1998, Detective Huggard interviewed M.L. a second time. M.L. stated that 
Cramer had touched M.L.'s "front" and "back" "private parts." M.L. denied that Cramer had 
ever inserted his finger into M.L.'s rectum or ever touched M.L.'s "private parts" at UNI. (R. 
724 at 164; R. 725 at 240-41, 244-45.) 
At trial, M.L. testified that Cramer would visit him at UNI and take him out to swim, eat, 
and visit parks. He testified that he liked going places with Cramer, he liked it when Cramer 
visited him at UNI, and he generally liked Cramer at that time. (R. 725 at 182-83, 186.) 
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M.L. testified that Cramer had touched him in ways that made him feel "uncomfortable." 
For example, M.L. testified that Cramer rubbed and pinched his buttocks both under and on top 
of M.L.'s clothes. M.L. testified that Cramer touched M.L.'s penis, both under and over M.L.'s 
clothing. M.L. testified that Cramer would grab and rub M.L.'s penis forcefully while asking 
M.L. if it felt good. M.L. testified that "it hurt." M.L. also testified that Cramer frequently 
pinched M.L.'s breasts. (Id. at 186-87,189-90, 192-94.) 
M.L. testified that Cramer touched M.L.'s "private parts" "a whole bunch." He testified 
that Cramer did this at the swimming pools and in the dressing rooms while the two were 
changing together. M.L. testified that he and Cramer "went to the swimming pool a lot." (Id. 
at 190, 192, 194-95.)2 
M.L. explained that he did not reveal Cramer's abuse during the first interview because 
he was afraid and believed that if he disclosed Cramer's abuse, he (M.L.) would "be in trouble." 
M.L. finally decided to tell his adoptive parents that Cramer had sexually abused him because 
they told him "that everything would be fine and [he] believed cem." (Id. at 197-98.) 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association ("LDA") attorneys Kim Clark and John O'Connell, 
Jr., represented Cramer at trial. They called only Detective Huggard. Through Detective 
Huggard, and using his interview transcripts, defense counsel highlighted inconsistencies in 
M.L.'s accounts of Cramer's abuse. Defense counsel elicited evidence that, in the first interview, 
M.L. denied that Cramer had ever touched him inappropriately, and that, based on M.L.'s 
2M.L. also testified that Cramer touched him in ways that were "okay." For example, 
M.L. testified that Cramer would pat him on the back, run his hands through his hair, give 
him hugs, and tuck him in at night at UNI. (R. 725 at 195.) 
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assurances, Detective Huggard closed the case. They elicited evidence that, although M.L. 
testified that Cramer pinched him, that the touching hurt, and that Cramer had asked him if it 
felt good, M.L. never reported those details to Huggard, instead reporting only that Cramer had 
touched his "front private" and his "back private." Detective Huggard also acknowledged that, 
although M.L. testified that he could only remember Cramer touching him in the swimming 
pools and locker rooms, M.L. reported to him that Cramer inappropriately touched him while 
the two were in Cramer's car. (R. 724 at 2; R. 725 at 193, 228-54, 270-77.) 
Defense counsel also cross-examined M.L. and emphasized inconsistencies between 
M.L.'s preliminary hearing testimony and his trial testimony. They demonstrated that M.L. 
testified at the preliminary hearing that Cramer only touched him inappropriately in the locker 
rooms, but testified at trial that Cramer touched him both in the locker rooms and the swimming 
pools. Trial Tr. at 203-04. They demonstrated that his preliminary hearing testimony included 
no accusation that Cramer pinched his buttocks in addition to rubbing it. Trial Tr. at 208. They 
demonstrated that, at the preliminary hearing, M.L. testified only that he "didn't know" why he 
did not disclose the abuse, in contradistinction to his trial testimony that he was afraid to do so. 
(R. 725 at 203-204, 208, 210-11). 
In addition to cross-examining M.L., trial counsel secured a stipulation that, at the 
preliminary hearing, M.L. did not testify that Cramer asked him if it felt good when Cramer 
fondled him {id. at 304-306). 
Cramer did not testify at trial. 
The jury convicted Cramer on both counts (id. at 338-39). The Utah Supreme Court 
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affirmed. State v. Cramer, 44 P.3d 690, 2002 UT 9. 
POST-CONVICTION CASE 
Cramer filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief ("Petition") (R. 15). As relevant 
to this appeal, he claimed that 1) his trial counsel were ineffective because they did not obtain 
DCFS's records on the investigation of M.L.'s accusations (CPS records); 2) his trial counsel 
were ineffective for failing to call several witnesses to testify on his behalf; 3) his trial counsel 
were ineffective for failing to obtain and admit as an exhibit the CASA logs that he prepared; 
4) his lead trial counsel was ineffective and denied Cramer his right to testify by telling him that 
she would not call him as a witness and by threatening to "step on his neck if he tried to testify;" 
5) his appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 
claims; and 6) his appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to supplement the record on 
appeal with M.L.'s UNI records that the trial court reviewed in camera. 
The State moved for partial summary judgment, which the post-conviction court granted 
in part and denied in part (R. 194-232 and 253-73). The post-conviction court limited the 
remaining claims for adjudication to whether appellate counsel were ineffective for omitting 
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims because trial counsel allegedly 1) did not obtain Det 
Huggard's, Kyle Cook's, and Linda Vraybill's records and did not use those records to impeach 
M.L.'s testimony; 2) did not investigate and call various, additional defense witnesses identified 
in the attachments to the petition; 3) did not use Cramer's CASA logs to impeach M.L.'s 
testimony; and 4) denied Cramer his right to testify. (R. 254-73.) 
In its July 18, 2005, Memorandum Decision, the post-conviction court rejected the 
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remaining claims and denied relief (R. 529-35, addendum B). 
The argument sections contain additional relevant facts. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
I. Procedurally barred ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims. 
Cramer claims that he may raise his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims in post-
conviction even though he could have, but did not raise them on direct appeal. The Post-
Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA") bars relief on all claims that could have been, but were not 
raised on direct appeal. Even pre-PCRA law precluded relief on ineffective-assistance-of-trial-
counsel claims that could have been, but were not raised on direct appeal. Cramer may obtain 
relief only if he can prove that his appellate counsel were ineffective for omitting the ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claims that he raised in post-conviction. 
II. Appellate challenges to Cramer's failure to testify. 
Cramer claims that appellate counsel should have sought reversal because 1) the trial 
court conducted no on-the-record colloquy concerning Cramer's right to testify; 2) trial counsel 
were ineffective because they did not advise Cramer that he had a constitutional right to testify 
despite their advice not to; and 3) trial counsel allegedly coerced and overbore Cramer's 
constitutional right to testify. 
Cramer had to prove that his appellate counsel overlooked a claim that was obvious from 
the record and probably would have succeeded. As to all three claims, Cramer presented no 
proof of any information that his appellate counsel had that would have pointed to an obvious 
appellate challenge to his failure to testify. 
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Cramer concedes that the absence of an on-the-record colloquy about his right to testify 
did not present an obvious appellate winner, recognizing that this Court's precedent foreclosed 
that claim. Cramer's concession defeats his challenge to appellate counsel's effectiveness. He 
identifies arguments that he claims appellate counsel could have made to challenge the Court's 
precedent. However, he had a constitutional right only to counsel who would find existing law, 
not to counsel who would argue for changes in the law. In addition, appellate counsel could not 
have succeeded on those arguments: they were not preserved in the trial court and could not 
constitute obvious error because they were inconsistent with controlling precedent. 
In order to prove that appellate counsel overlooked an obvious ineffective-assistance-of-
trial-counsel claim that probably would have succeeded, Cramer had to prove that appellate 
counsel could have proven both deficient performance by trial counsel, and that any proven 
deficient performance prejudiced Cramer. Cramer did not prove that appellate counsel 
overlooked an obvious claim that probably would have succeeded with respect to trial counsel's 
advice about testifying. Cramer argues his trial counsel never told him that he had a 
constitutional right to testify despite their advice not to. However, the post-conviction court 
found that trial counsel thoroughly covered the subject of him testifying. Cramer has not met 
his burden of marshaling the evidence to show that the post-conviction erred in that finding. 
In addition, Cramer cites no controlling authority that required trial counsel to caution him that 
he had a constitutional right to testify despite their advice. Without that controlling authority, 
he failed to prove that appellate counsel overlooked an obvious claim under existing law. 
Cramer's argument that his trial counsel overbore his will depends on facts found against 
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him. 
Finally, Cramer proved no prejudice from his failure to testify. He argues that, if he had 
testified, the jury would have heard equally plausible accounts from equally impeached witnesses. 
The evidence does not support that proposition. Cramer testified at the post-conviction hearing 
about what he would have testified to before the jury. That testimony included no denial of 
M.L.'s accusations. Moreover, Cramer's testimony would have opened the door to the jury 
hearing that he pleaded guilty to two counts of lewdness with two other young boys under 
circumstances similar to those which M.L. described. Cramer's testimony would have bolstered 
rather than called into question M.L.'s accusations. 
III. Failure to supplement the direct-appeal record. 
Cramer's trial counsel sought access to M.L.'s UNI records. The trial court reviewed the 
records in camera and concluded that they included nothing suitable for disclosure under 
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987). On appeal, Cramer argued that the trial court 
erroneously refused to turn over the records. The supreme court rejected the claim because 
Cramer did not include the UNI records in the direct appeal record, noting that he had not 
followed the Court's c,iggestion at oral argument that he do so. 
In post-conviction, Cramer claimed that his appellate counsel were ineffective for failing 
to supplement the record. The post-conviction judge rejected the claim because the same judge 
sitting as the trial judge had "already reviewed the records in camera . . . and found nothing 
material," and because Cramer "fail[ed] to demonstrate any deficiency in [the trial court's] review 
of the records." (R. 270-71.) 
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Cramer cannot prove error in the post-conviction court's ruling because he has failed to 
include the UNI records in the post-conviction appellate record. The supreme court rejected 
his direct appeal claim because, without having the UNI records to review, it could not 
determine whether the trial court erroneously withheld any of them. Likewise, Cramer cannot 
prove that the post-conviction court erroneously rejected his ineffective assistance claim without 
the records because, without them, he cannot prove that the post-conviction court should have 
found that, had appellate counsel included the records in the direct appeal record, Cramer 
probably would have succeeded on direct appeal. 
IV. Investigation of documents and witnesses. 
Cramer claims that appellate counsel should have challenged trial counsel's investigation 
and use of the witnesses he identified, the CASA logs, and the CPS report. Cramer failed to 
identify an obvious ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. The documents and letter 
identifying the witnesses were not in the appellate record. He presented no proof of information 
that he provided to appellate counsel that would have alerted them to this claim. 
Alternatively, his post-conviction evidence failed to prove that the claim probably would 
have succeeded. Trial counsel's investigator contacted all of the witnesses Cramer identified and 
provided a report to counsel. Counsel remembered at least two who were hostile to Cramer. 
The others were character witnesses; counsel feared that calling character witnesses would open 
the door to Cramer's prior guilty pleas to lewdness with two other young boys. Because trial 
counsel thoroughly investigated the witnesses Cramer identified, appellate counsel could not 
have succeeded on a challenge to her decision not to call them. In addition, Cramer did not 
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prove that any of the witnesses could have provided evidence that would have made a more 
favorable outcome at trial reasonably likely. 
Trial counsel obtained and reviewed the CASA logs prior to trial. After doing so, she 
determined not to admit them as an exhibit. At the post-conviction hearing, she explained the 
reasons for her decision. Because trial counsel thoroughly investigated the CASA logs and made 
a strategic decision not to use them, appellate counsel could not have succeeded on a challenge 
to her decision not to admit them as an exhibit. 
Counsel admitted that she did not remember seeing the CPS report, but testified that she 
knew about the information it contained. Cramer provided no proof that anything in the report 
varied so dramatically from what the jury heard that its absence undermines confidence in the 
outcome. 
Finally, Cramer failed to prove that appellate counsel could have proven prejudice. He 
contends that the witnesses and documents, coupled with his testimony, would have presented 
the jury with equally plausible stories. The jury would not have heard equally plausible stories. 
V. Cumulative error. 
Cramer argues that, if appellate counsel's alleged errors were not individually prejudicial, 
they were cumulatively prejudicial. Cramer proved only one incident of deficient performance: 
appellate counsel should have supplemented the appellate record with the UNI records. Cramer 
proved no prejudice on that claim. 
Moreover, the case that he claims his trial counsel should have presented and which he 
supported with evidence at the post-conviction proceeding would have assured his conviction. 
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Rather than hearing only M.L.'s uncorroborated accusations with the inconsistencies in his 
accounts highlighted, the jury would have heard no denial from Cramer to M.L.'s accusations 
and evidence that Cramer pleaded guilty to touching other little boys inappropriately under 
circumstances similar to those that M.L. described. If the jury convicted on the case it heard, 
the jury certainly would have convicted on the case Cramer now says he wanted it to hear. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE-OF-TRIAL COUNSEL CLAIMS THAT 
COULD HAVE BEEN, BUT WERE NOT RAISED ON DIRECT 
APPEAL ARE PROCEDURALLY BARRED 
Cramer insists that he may raise his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims for the 
first time in post-conviction proceedings. Appellant's Brief at 19, 26, 31, and 44. Controlling 
law supports the post-conviction court's ruling to the contrary (R. 529-30). 
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA") bars relief for all claims that could have 
been, but were not raised during the direct appeal, and does not exclude ineffective-assistance-
of-trial-counsel claims. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(c) (West 2004). Cf. also Carter v. 
Galetka, 44 P.3d 626, 2001 UT 96 \\\ (finding under pre-PCRA law that several ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claims were procedurally barred because Carter could have, but did 
not raise them on direct appeal). As even Cramer recognizes, his appellate counsel could have, 
but did not challenge trial counsel's performance during the direct appeal. Appellant's Brief at 
20-24. See State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App. 1991) (appellant may challenge trial 
counsel's performance on direct appeal when there is an adequate record and he has new 
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counsel on appeal); Utah R. App. P. 23B (permitting a remand during a direct appeal to develop 
a record in support of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim). The post-conviction 
court correctly applied controlling law to bar Cramer's ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 
claims. The court correctly assess those claims only in the context of Cramer's challenge to his 
appellate counsers failure to raise them on direct appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(2) (West 
2004) ("a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been but was 
not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance 
of counsel"). 
Cramer's authority does not support his argument that he may raise the ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claims for the first time in post-conviction. To support that argument 
he relies solely on Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873 (Utah 1990), citing it for the proposition that 
"constitutional issues such as ineffective assistance of trial counsel can always be raised in 
collateral post-conviction proceedings, regardless of whether or not they were raised in direct 
appeal." Appellant's Brief at 26 and 31. According to Cramer, Dunn holds that "ineffective 
assistance may be raised in a post-conviction proceeding even if not raised on direct appeal 
because a post-conviction remedy is to provide a means for collaterally attacking convictions 
that are constitutionally flawed, and the general policy favoring finality of judgments cannot 
prevail against a post-conviction collateral attack because c[a]s important as finality is, it does not 
have a higher value than constitutional guarantees of liberty.'" Appellant's Brief at 26-27 (citing 
Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d at 875-77.) 
Cramer misstates the Dunn holding. Only one justice concurred in the reasoning on 
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which Cramer relies. Dunn v. Cook, 719 P.2d at 879. Two expressly rejected it. Id. at 879-90. 
Therefore, Dunn did not hold what Cramer claims it held. 
Dunn actually supports the State's argument that Cramer could obtain post-conviction 
relief only on his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims. A majority of the supreme court 
agreed that Dunn could raise the trial-counsel claims in post-conviction only because his 
appellate counsel was ineffective for omitting them on appeal. Id. at 875-80. 
POINT II 
CRAMER DID NOT PROVE THAT HIS APPELLATE COUNSEL 
WERE INEFFECTIVE FOR OMITTING CHALLENGES TO HIS 
FAILURE TO TESTIFY 
Cramer argues that appellate counsel should have sought reversal because 1) the trial 
court conducted no on-the-record colloquy concerning Cramer's right to testify; 2) trial counsel 
were ineffective because they did not advise Cramer that he had a constitutional right to testify 
despite their advice not to; and 3) trial counsel allegedly prevented Cramer from exercising his 
right to testify by coercing him and overbearing his will. Appellant's Brief at 19-33 and 35-39. 
Cramer affirmatively waived the third claim; he cannot rely on it for reversal. As to all three 
claims, he failed to meet his burden of proving that appellate counsel overlooked an obvious 
error the probably would have succeeded. 
A. Additional relevant facts. 
Prior to trial, Cramer pleaded guilty to two counts of lewdness with a child. The counts 
involved two different boys from the same family. The State alleged that the events took place 
at a swimming pool. (R. 547 at 29-31, 45-46.) 
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Trial counsel moved to exclude the two prior convictions (R. 641-44). The trial court 
ruled that the convictions were admissible. (R. 723 at 37.) 
After that ruling, but prior to trial, one of Cramer's victims died, and State's counsel 
determined not to call the other. The trial court then ruled that the State could bring in evidence 
of the prior lewdness convictions only if Cramer testified. (R. 547 at 55.) 
At the preliminary hearing, trial counsel advised Cramer on the record that he had the 
right to testify at the preliminary hearing, and Cramer had at least one meeting with counsel after 
the preliminary hearing, but before trial (id. at 9, 32-33). 
Cramer did not testify at trial. In post-conviction, Cramer claimed that his trial counsel 
threatened to "step on his neck" if he tried to testify. He testified at the post-conviction hearing 
that his counsel told him that he was not going to testify, and that they would not discuss it 
further. He further testified that he did not know that he had the right to testify even if counsel 
advised him not to (R. 354; 547 at 10, 12). 
During the post-conviction hearing, Cramer testified that, if he had testified at trial, he 
could have explained what the CASA logs were and why he wrote them. He could have 
explained the Child Protective Services investigation report (CCCPS report") and procedures. He 
could have explained that the DCFS procedures required making a determination whether an 
abuse allegation was substantiated.3 He could have explained that DCFS did not follow their 
ordinary procedures with him because they did not contact him. He could have "helped" the 
jury understand his role with M.L. and his history as a child advocate. (Id. at 14-16). However, 
3As detailed in Point IV, the DCFS investigator concluded that M.L.'s accusation was 
substantiated. 
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he never denied M.L.'s allegations, even after the State's post-conviction counsel asked him 
whether there was anything else he thought was important to put on record about what he 
would have testified to at trial (id. at 44).4 
Cramer's trial counsel, Ms. Kim Clark and Mr. John O'Connell, Jr., also testified at the 
post-conviction hearing. Ms. Clark testified that, after the trial judge ruled that the State could 
introduce Cramer's guilty pleas to lewdness with two other young boys, she planned to call 
Cramer to testify if he wanted to testify. She explained that, based on the judge's ruling, she did 
not think it would hurt Cramer's case to have him testify. (Id. at 67-68). 
However, after circumstances changed so that Cramer's prior guilty pleas to lewdness 
with two other young boys would not come in unless Cramer testified, Ms. Clark advised Cramer 
not to testify due to the way juries view "prior consistent offenses." She explained that, based 
on her experience, "if the jury heard that he had done something like this before that their 
conclusion most likely would be that he had done this offense." She explained further that she 
believed that "it was a really bad idea for [the jury] to hear that [Cramer] had a prior offense, 
actually two that were similar," and that "they'd be more likely to convict." (Id. at 55, 68.) 
Cramer's post-conviction counsel asked Ms. Clark whether she advised Cramer that "he 
had a right to testify on his own behalf despite [her advice] not to." Ms. Clark responded, "I 
don't believe I put it in those terms, no." (Id. at 57.) Mr. O'Connell agreed that he had no 
^ h e State's post-conviction counsel emphasized in his closing argument that Cramer 
never testified at the post-conviction hearing that he would have denied M.L.'s abuse 
allegations if he had testified at trial (id. at 116). Cramer did not challenge that argument on 
rebuttal or seek to re-open the evidence to testify that he would have denied the allegations if 
he had testified at trial. 
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specific recollection of telling Cramer that Cramer had a right to testify despite counsel's advice 
not to (id. at 96-97). 
When asked how Cramer reacted to the advice not to testify, Ms. Clarke responded, "I 
don't think he said anything, he just nodded and looked at me." She also testified that Cramer 
never told her that he wanted to testify despite her advice that it would be a bad idea, and that 
she did not recall Cramer telling her during trial that he wanted to testify. She repeatedly 
characterized the decision whether to testify as belonging to Cramer. Mr. O'Connell testified 
that he had no recollection of Cramer stating that he wanted to testify, but allowed that it was 
possible Cramer did. (id. at 68-69, 100-101). 
Ms. Clark specifically denied threatening Cramer to keep him off the stand, testifying, "I 
never do that to my own clients." She also denied threatening to step on Cramer's neck, 
testifying, "I've never said that statement ever in my whole existence. It's not a phrase that I 
would use and it's nothing I'd heard before this petition." (Id. at 68-69.) 
In his closing argument, Cramer's post-conviction attorney asserted that Cramer was not 
arguing that he was denied his right to testify. Rather, he was arguing only that he was never 
advised of that right; therefore, he did not waive it knowingly. (Id. at 120.) 
The post-conviction court rejected Cramer's claims concerning his right to testify. The 
court wrote, "[l]ooking at Ms. Clark's and Mr. O'Connell's testimonies as a whole, the Court 
finds that the issue of Petitioner testifying at trial was thoroughly covered by counsel." The 
court found "not credible" Cramer's testimony that his counsel threatened him if he tried to 
testify. The court further found that Cramer's incredible assertions about counsel threatening 
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him raised "an issue" about the credibility of the rest of Cramer's post-conviction testimony. 
(R. 532-34.) 
B. Cramer failed to prove ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
In order to demonstrate that his appellate counsel were ineffective, Cramer had the 
burden of proving that his arguments concerning his failure to testify were obvious from the 
record, and that they probably would have succeeded. Carter v. Galetka„ 44 P.3d 626,2001 UT 
96, ^48.5 Cramer failed to meet that burden. 
As to all three claims, Cramer has never identified what information appellate counsel 
had that should have alerted them to any appellate claim grounded in his failure to testify. 
Cramer merely failed to take the stand; criminal defendants often do not. The preliminary 
hearing record included trial counsel's advice that Cramer had the right to testify at the 
preliminary hearing; nothing in the record suggests that he had a different understanding about 
trial. Trial counsel thoroughly explored the inconsistencies in M.L.'s accounts. The trial court 
ruled that, if Cramer testified, the jury could hear that he pleaded guilty to two counts of 
lewdness with two other young boys. Nothing in the appellate record would have made it 
obvious to appellate counsel that Cramer wished to take the stand, offer no denial of M.L.'s 
accusations, and let the jury hear about his prior guilty pleas. 
Similarly, Cramer presented no evidence of anything he told appellate counsel that would 
5Cramer argues that the probably-would-have-succeeded standard adopted in Carter 
overstates his burden of proof and invites the Court not to follow it. Appellant's Brief at 21-
22. Carter is a Utah Supreme Court case; this Court is bound to follow supreme court 
precedent. See, e.g., State v. Menkes, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994) (a lower court must 
follow strictly the decisions of a higher court), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). 
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have alerted them to any problem with his failure to testify. He never proved that he repeated 
to appellate counsel the facts on which he relied in post-conviction to complain about his failure 
to testify. He cannot fault his counsel for failing to divine those facts. See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (the constitutional sufficiency of counsel's performance 
depends in large part on the information his client provides). 
Cramer's failure to prove that appellate counsel overlooked an obvious challenge to his 
failure to testify independentiy defeats his claim. Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, [^48 (Cramer 
must prove that appellate counsel overlooked an obvious claim). 
Cramer did not prove that appellate counsel overlooked an obvious argument for reversal 
based on the absence of an on-the-record colloquy advising Cramer about his right to testify. 
To the contrary, Cramer acknowledges that "the issue would not have been an obvious winner" 
because this Court previously rejected the claim in State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 362 (Utah App. 
1992). Appellant's Brief at 35. Nevertheless he argues that appellate counsel had a 
constitutional obligation to argue for the colloquy because 1) Brooks included no separate state 
constitutional analysis, the issue is significant, and there purportedly exists an "emerging trend" 
toward an on-the-record colloquy;6 2) Brooks voluntarily chose not to testify; Cramer 
6This Court did not ignore the issue of a separate state constitutional analysis in 
Brooks, It recognized that Brooks argued for such an analysis, but found his arguments 
unpersuasive. State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d at 364 n.2. Cramer identifies no argument that his 
appellate counsel should have recognized that would have been sufficient to meet their 
"substantial burden" to justify overturning Brooks' rejection of a separate state constitutional 
rule. See, e.g., State v. Menkes, 889 P.2d at 398 (party seeking to overturn existing precedent 
have a substantial burden to justify doing so). 
Although Cramer argues that there is an "emerging trend" toward requiring such a 
colloquy, he cites no authority to establish such a shift in authority that counsel could have 
met the "substantial burden" to justify overturning Brooks. Indeed, he cites only Boyd v. 
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"persistently maintained that he wanted to testify, but was precluded from doing so by his 
counsel;"7 and 3) the United States Supreme Court stated in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), 
that the right to testify is even more fundamental than the right to self-representation, and, if the 
right to self-representation without counsel requires an on-the-record colloquy, then the right 
to testify should.8 Appellant's Brief at 38-39. 
Despite these suggested arguments, Cramer's concession that appellate counsel 
overlooked no "obvious winner" in light of Brooks defeats his claim. By his own admission, he 
cannot prove either element of his ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim: that 
appellate counsel overlooked an obvious claim. Carter P. Galetka, 2001 UT 96 ^[48. 
Moreover, Cramer only had the right to appellate counsel who would find existing law. 
See Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1052 (10th Cir.) ("we have rejected ineffective assistance 
United States, 586 A.2d 670 (D.C. App 1991), for the proposition that such a trend is 
emerging. Appellant's Brief at 38. This Court rejected the Boyd analysis in Brooks. State v. 
Brooks, 833 P.2d at 364-65. 
7This argument relies on facts that the record does not support or that were resolved 
against him by the post-conviction court. The post-conviction court found that trial counsel 
did not prevent Cramer from testifying. In another argument, Cramer cited to trial counsel's 
post-conviction testimony to support his assertion that he "persistently" asked to testify. As 
detailed below, the assertion misstates trial counsel's testimony. Trial counsel testified that 
Cramer was generally persistent. However, she testified that, when she advised Cramer not 
to testify because it would result in the jury hearing that he pleaded guilty to lewdness with 
two other young boys, Cramer looked at her and nodded. (R. 547 at 56 and 68.) 
8Cramer's logic is flawed. A court must inquire only when a defendant exercises his 
right to self-representation. Faretta v. California, All U.S. 806, 835 (1975). Cramer cites no 
authority, and the State is aware of none, that requires an on-record-colloquy every time a 
defendant fails to exercise his right to self-representation. Cramer's argument does not 
demonstrate that this Court erroneously held that a trial court need not conduct an on-the-
record colloquy every time a defendant fails to exercise his right to testify. 
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claims where a defendant 'faults his former counsel not for failing to find existing law, but for 
failing to predict future law' and have warned 'that clairvoyance is not a required attribute of 
effective representation"'), cert denied, 537 U.S. 1093 (2002). See also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 
510, 523 (2003) (counsel's performance must be assessed from her '"perspective at the time"') 
(citation omitted). As Cramer acknowledges, existing law foreclosed the very claim that he 
argues counsel should have pursued. Appellant's Brief at 35, citing State v. brooks, 833 P.2d 362 
(Utah App. 1992). Although he proffers arguments that appellate counsel could have made to 
change that law, he had no constitutional right to counsel who would argue for a change in the 
law. 
Cramer also failed to prove that the appellate argument probably would have succeeded 
because he cannot prove that appellate counsel could have met their burden on this unpreserved 
claim. Cramer did not make any of his present arguments in the trial court; therefore, appellate 
counsel could have succeeded only if they could have demonstrated that the trial court obviously 
erred by not conducting an on-the-record colloquy. State v. Gulbransen, 106 P.3d 734, 2005 UT 
7 ^[46-48. To meet that burden, they would have had to demonstrate, among other things, that 
the requirement for an on-the-record colloquy about Cramer's right to testify was so well 
established by Utah law that the trial court should have recognized and complied with it even 
though Cramer never raised the issue. See State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah) (error not 
obvious where the appellate decision requiring the omitted action had not yet been decided), cert 
denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). As Cramer recognizes, the well-established law holds the opposite. 
His appellate counsel could not have demonstrated the obvious error component of a plain error 
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argument. 
According to Cramer, his appellate counsel also should have argued that his trial counsel 
were ineffective in advising him about his right to testify. To succeed on these claims, Cramer 
had to prove that appellate counsel could have proven constitutionally deficient performance 
by trial counsel. He had to prove that appellate counsel could have proven specific acts or 
omissions by trial counsel that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 690 (1984); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d at 521. He had to prove 
that appellate counsel could have overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered 
adequate assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690; State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 
(Utah 1997), cert denied, 525 U.S. 833 (1998); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d at 522. 
Cramer argues that he proved that trial counsel never informed him of his right to testify. 
Appellant's Brief at 26. The argument depends on facts found against him. The post-conviction 
court found that trial counsel "thoroughly covered" the issue of Cramer testifying at trial (R. 547 
at 533). To challenge that finding, Cramer must "combQ the record for and compilfe] all the 
evidence" that supports the post-conviction court's finding. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan 
Manufacturing Corp., 54 P.3d 1177, 2002 UT 94 ^[21; Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 2004 UT 82 
|^20 (appellant must marshal the evidence "if a determination of the correctness of a court's 
application of a legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive"). He '"must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings [he] resists.5" Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82 %I1 (citation omitted). He 
must "'temporarily remove [his] own prejudices and fully embrace [respondent's] position'; he 
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. . . must play the "devil's advocate/"" Id. at f78 (citation omitted). Then, he must demonstrate 
that the marshaled evidence was legally insufficient to support the challenged finding. Wilson 
Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Manufacturing Corp., 2002 UT 94 ^[21. 
Cramer has not met that burden. Ms. Clark advised Cramer on the record that he had 
the right to testify at the preliminary hearing; Cramer cites nothing to support finding that he 
would have lesser rights at trial. When asked whether she told Cramer that he had a "right" to 
testify despite her advice, Ms. Clark responded only that she did not believe that she put it "in 
those terms" (R. 547 at 57). However, she never testified that she misinformed Cramer that he 
could not make the choice. Moreover, she testified that she advised Cramer not to testify (id. 
at 55, 67). Inherent in "advising" a client not to testify is the acknowledgment that the decision 
belongs to the client. Although the post-conviction court did not believe Cramer's assertion that 
Ms. Clark threatened to "step on his neck" if he tried to testify, that assertion reveals that 
Cramer understood that he could testify despite her advice: he falsely claimed that his counsel 
threatened violence against him if he attempted to exercise that right. The evidence Cramer fails 
to marshal supports the post-conviction court's finding that counsel "thoroughly covered" the 
issue of whether he would testify. 
Even if Cramer had proved that his trial counsel did not inform him that he had the right 
to testify despite their advice, he identifies no controlling case law available to appellate or trial 
counsel that required trial counsel to do so.9 Even the non-controlling authority on which 
Cramer relies recognizes that the federal circuits split on whether counsel have an affirmative 
9Cramer relies only on one published federal circuit court decision, one unpublished 
circuit court decision, and one federal district court decision. Appellant's Brief at 25. 
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duty to advise their clients that they have the right to testify despite counsel's advice. Artu^ v. 
Brown, 124 F.3d 73, 78-79 (2nd Cir. 1997). Appellate counsel had no constitutional obligation to 
argue that trial counsel had a duty that existing law did not impose. See Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 
at 1052; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 523. Similarly, appellate counsel could not have proven 
deficient performance because trial counsel failed to perform a duty that the law did not clearly 
impose. See Smallmod v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999) (person challenging 
counsel's effectiveness cannot demonstrate deficient performance merely by demonstrating that 
trial counsel did not do what was "prudent or appropriate;" he must demonstrate that counsel 
failed to do what the constitution compelled), cert, denied, 519 U.S. 980 (2000). Cf. also State v. 
Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 906-907 (Ut. App. 1994) (comparing obvious error to deficient 
performance), reversed on other grounds, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996).10 
Cramer also argues that his appellate counsel should have argued that trial counsel 
overbore his will and prevented him from exercising his right to testify. Appellant's Brief at 29-
10Cramer argues that the Tenth Circuit has held that "failing to advise an accused of 
his right to testify and that he has the right to disregard counsel's advice not to testify is 
sufficient to meet" the deficient performance element of Strickland. Appellant's Brief at 25 
(citing United States v. Hershberger, slip op. 90-3237 at 3 (10th Cir. July 24, 1991)). He leaves the 
impression that the Tenth Circuit has held that counsel must give such advice in all 
circumstances. That impression is false. The Tenth Circuit held that Hershberger would be 
entided to relief if he could "prove that his counsel prevented him from testifying by 
asserting that counsel, rather than defendant, would make the decision whether defendant 
would testify." The court also held that Hershberger's "allegations that defense counsel 
failed to inform him that he alone controlled the decision to testify and that defense counsel 
failed to let him testify despite his expressed desire to do so, if proved, would be sufficient to 
meet the first requirement of the Strickland'test" Id. (emphasis added). As detailed in the 
text, Cramer did not prove that defense counsel refused to let him testify despite his desire to 
do so, or that they misled him to believe that the decision whether he would testify was theirs 
rather than his. 
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33. The Court may not reverse on this claim because Cramer affirmatively waived it in the post-
conviction court. During the post-conviction hearing, Cramer insisted that he was arguing only 
that he was not advised of his right to testify, which resulted in him waiving it unknowingly. He 
specifically disavowed any claim that he was denied that right. (R. 547 at 120). Having waived 
the claim, he cannot ask this Court to rely on it as a reason to reverse. See, e.g, State v. Bullock, 791 
P.2d 155,158-59 (Utah 1989) (appellate court will not reverse based on a claim that the appellant 
affirmatively waived in the lower court), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990). 
Alternatively, Cramer failed to prove that appellate counsel overlooked an obvious claim 
that trial counsel overbore his will. On appeal, Cramer asserts that 1) he "was 'persistent5 in 
letting trial counsel know that he wanted to testify;" 2) trial counsel was adamant about Cramer 
not testifying; 3) counsel told Cramer that he was not going to testify; 4) counsel threatened to 
'"step on his neck"' if he tried to testify; and 5) trial counsel, instead of telling Cramer that he 
could override her advice, told Cramer that she would not discuss the issue with him again. 
Appellant's Brief at 30. 
As to the first, Cramer asserts that trial counsel noted that Cramer "was 'persistent' in 
letting trial counsel know that he wanted to testify." Appellant's Brief at 30. He misstates 
counsel's testimony. Ms. Clark agreed with Cramer's post-conviction counsel's statement that 
Cramer is "mild-mannered" and "not forceful." She added that Cramer is "persistent." (R. 547 
at 56.) However, the testimony refers to her perception of Cramer's general characteristics, not 
whether he wanted to testify. Counsel testified that Cramer responded to her advice not to 
testify by looking at her and nodding. She did not recall Cramer ever stating that he wanted to 
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testify despite her advice against it. (R. 547 at 56, 68.) 
The remainder of Cramer's assertions depend on his testimony. The post-conviction 
court found that his assertion that counsel threatened him was not credible, and that assertion 
raised an issue about the credibility of the rest of his testimony. The court also found that 
counsel thoroughly covered the issue of whether Cramer would testify, which necessarily means 
that the Court rejected Cramer's assertion that counsel refused to discuss the issue. 
Cramer also had the burden of proving that appellate counsel could have proven 
prejudice. Cramer had to prove that appellate counsel could have proven that trial counsel's 
errors undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694; Parsons 
v. Barnes, 871 P.2d at 522. Cramer had to prove that appellate counsel could have proven that, 
but for trial counsel's errors, 1) he would have testified; and 2) his testimony would have made 
a more favorable outcome reasonably likely. Cf. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534-38 (2003) 
(holding that, to prove prejudice from counsel's capital penalty phase investigation and 
presentation, Wiggins had to prove both that 1) a reasonably competent attorney would have 
presented the undiscovered mitigation evidence at the penalty hearing; and 2) there is a 
reasonable probability that, if counsel had presented the evidence, at least one juror would have 
struck the balance of aggravating and mitigating evidence in Wiggin's favor). Cramer did not 
meet that burden. 
Cramer argues that, had he testified, "the jury would have been given the choice between 
two different stories^/0 equally impeached witnesses?* Appellant's Brief at 32 (emphasis added). 
He continues that "equally plausible stories from competing, imperfect witnesses" raises a 
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reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome. Id. (emphasis added). 
Whether equally plausible stories from equally impeached witnesses is sufficient to prove 
prejudice is irrelevant to this case because Cramer did not prove that that is what the jury would 
have heard. The jury heard that M.L. accused Cramer of fondling him at swimming pools. They 
also heard that M.L. initially denied any abuse, although later explained that he did so because 
he was afraid. They heard that his accounts of the abuse changed between the two interviews 
with Detective Huggard, changed again at the preliminary hearing, and changed yet again at trial. 
They heard testimony about Cramer's CASA log entries, specifying some of what he did with 
M.L. and that he spent an "inordinate amount" of time with him. Had Cramer testified, the jury 
also would have heard 1) Cramer's explanations about some of the CASA log entries (that he 
intended to provide bonding experiences with M.L. to prepare him for adoption), 2) no denial 
of M.L.'s abuse allegations, and 3) that Cramer pleaded guilty to two counts of lewdness with 
two other boys involving conduct at a swimming pool. 
The jury would not have heard two equally "plausible stories" from "equally impeached" 
witnesses. The jury would have heard M.L.'s undenied accusations bolstered by the evidence 
that Cramer previously molested two other boys under circumstances similar to those M.L. 
described. Indeed, Cramer's testimony would have undone counsel's impeachment of M.L. 
Cramer has not proven that adding his testimony to that which the jury heard would raise a 
reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome. 
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POINT III 
CRAMER'S APPELLATE RECORD IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
DEMONSTRATE THAT THE POST-CONVICTION COURT 
INCORRECTLY REJECTED HIS CLAIM THAT HIS APPELLATE 
COUNSEL WERE INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO SUPPLEMENT 
THE APPELLATE RECORD WITH HIS UNI RECORDS 
Cramer claims that his appellate counsel were ineffective because they argued that the 
trial court erroneously failed to turn over the UNI records, but failed to supplement the 
appellate record with the UNI records. The State conceded that counsel were deficient. 
However, the Cramer has not proven that the post-conviction court should have granted him 
relief: he has not included the UNI records in the post-conviction appellate record. 
A. Additional facts. 
Prior to trial, defense counsel moved for access to all of M.L.'s UNI records and served 
subpoenas on UNI. Defense counsel also moved to compel disclosure of "all psychological and 
psychiatric records of [M.L.'s] from March 18, 1996 to the present date5' (R. 611-18, 622-32). 
The trial court held two hearings on trial counsel's discovery requests (R. 619-21,633-34, 
723). At the second, the trial court agreed to review M.L.'s UNI records in camera, but required 
trial counsel to prepare a written request specifying the particular information in the records that 
counsel believed would be material to Cramer's defense (R. 633-34,723 at 21 -22). Trial counsel 
listed eighteen specific categories of information that the trial court should look for in the 
records (R. 635-37). 
The trial court denied Cramer's motion to compel. The trial court reviewed the records 
in camera and "found no records appropriate for release under [Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 
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(1987)]" (R. 635-37). 
On direct appeal, Cramer argued, among other things, that the trial court erroneously 
ruled, based on its in camera review, that none of M.L.'s UNI records was material. The Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed, holding, in part, that it could not review the trial court's ruling because 
Cramer did not include the UNI records in the appellate record. As to the latter, the supreme 
court observed that Cramer should have requested permission to file the records under seal, and 
that appellate counsel did not move to supplement the record even after the Court pointed out 
the omission during oral argument. See generally State v. Cramer, 44 P.3d 690,2002 UT 9 ffi[25-28. 
The post-conviction court rejected Cramer's claim that appellate counsel were ineffective. 
The court recognized that the State conceded deficient performance. The court rejected the 
claim because the same judge sitting as the trial judge had "already reviewed the records in camera 
. . . and found nothing material," and because Cramer "fail[ed] to demonstrate any deficiency 
in [the trial court's] review of the records." (R. 270-71.) 
B. Cramer has demonstrated no error in the post-conviction court's ruling; to the contrary, 
his failure to include the records in the post-conviction appeal repeats the error that 
defeated his direct appeal. 
Cramer faults his appellate attorneys because they did not include the UNI records in the 
appellate record. To succeed on this claim, he had to prove that, had appellate counsel done so, 
his appellate claim probably would have succeeded. Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626, 2001 UT 96 
TJ48. Cramer would have won on appeal only if appellate counsel proved that failing to disclose 
the UNI records undermined confidence in the outcome. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59-
62 (1987) (holding that courts must provide the defense with "material evidence" and defining 
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"material evidence" to mean that the failure to provide it undermines confidence in the 
outcome). 
As he did on direct appeal, Cramer failed to include those records in this appeal His 
failure to do so makes the direct appeal decision dispositive of his post-conviction appeal. The 
supreme court could not determine on direct appeal whether the trial court erroneously withheld 
evidence material to Cramer's defense because Cramer did not include the UNI records in the 
direct appeal record. State v. Cramer, 2002 UT 9 ^[25-28. Likewise, this Court cannot determine 
whether the post-conviction court should have found that the direct appeal probably would have 
succeeded had counsel included the UNI records because Cramer has not included those records 
in this appeal. Id. See also State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 687 (1997) (Taylor failed to demonstrate 
prejudice concerning mental health mitigation investigation when he produced none of the 
mental health evidence that he claimed that his trial counsel could have discovered), cert, denied, 
525 U.S. 833 (1998). 
Cramer rationalizes his failure by speculating that the UNI records provided to the trial 
court could not be recreated now and UNI would have refused to provide them just as it did at 
trial. Appellant's Brief at 34. He offers nothing more than his unsupported statement to argue 
that the records could not be recreated.11 The trial court judge ordered UNI to turn over the 
nEven if true, the inability to recreate those records would preclude post-conviction 
relief. Cramer has the burden of proving his entidement to post-conviction relief. See, e.g., 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-105 (West 2004). If he cannot do so because the records cannot 
be recreated, then the claim fails. See Parson v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 522-23 (Utah), cert, denied, 
513 U.S. 966 (1994) (Parsons asked the supreme court to excuse indigent, incarcerated 
petitioners from proving Stickland prejudice because they lacked the resources to develop the 
necessary evidence; the supreme court rejected the request). 
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records for in camera review; Cramer offers no reason why the same judge sitting as the post-
conviction judge would not have done the same. Without providing the records in the post-
conviction appeal, Cramer cannot prove that the post-conviction court should have found that 
appellate counsel, had they included the records in the direct appeal, probably would have 
succeeded on Cramer's claim that the trial court withheld "material evidence" in the UNI 
records. 
IV 
CRAMER FAILED TO PROVE THAT APPELLATE COUNSEL 
S H O U L D H A V E C H A L L E N G E D TRIAL C O U N S E L ' S 
INVESTIGATION OF WITNESSES AND DOCUMENTS 
Cramer claims that his appellate counsel should have challenged trial counsel's 1) 
investigation of and decision not to call the witnesses Cramer identified for them, 2) decision 
not to admit the CASA logs as exhibits, and 3) investigation of and failure to use the CPS report. 
Appellant's Brief at 39-48. Cramer failed to prove that counsel overlooked a claim that was 
obvious from the record or that probably would have succeeded. 
A. Additional relevant facts. 
Prior to trial, defense counsel moved for access to Cramer's CASA logs (Cramer's reports 
of his interactions with M.L. as a CASA volunteer (R. 547 at 15-16)) and all of DCFS's records 
for M.L. (R. 611-18). Counsel obtained and reviewed the CASA logs. Trial counsel recognized 
that the defense could have admitted the records without Cramer's testimony. (R. 547 at 62-63.) 
However, she did not consider the CASA records helpful overall. First, admitting the logs as 
an exhibit would have allowed the jury to calculate the amount of time Cramer spent with M.L. 
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This contravened the defense strategy of trying to minimize how much time it appeared that 
Cramer spent with MX. (Id at 65, 91.) 
Second, counsel considered the information in the logs "self-serving." She thought that 
also presented a problem for using them in Cramer's defense. (Id. at 64-65.) 
Third, admitting the CASA logs into evidence without calling Cramer to testify would 
have allowed the jury to see things that looked bad, such as entries that State's post-conviction 
counsel emphasized in his examination of Cramer that Cramer tickled and cuddled with M.L., 
drove M.L. to a campsite where M.L. sat on Cramer's lap and played a flute, and discussed the 
anatomical differences between boys and girls at a swimming pool (M.L. claimed Cramer 
molested him at swimming pools they frequented together). Trial counsel did not want to call 
Cramer to explain these things because the jury then would have learned that Cramer pleaded 
guilty to lewdness with two other boys at swimming pools. (Id at 39-41, 64-65, 91-92.) 
The CPS records were the Child Protective Service's report generated by DCFS as a 
result of M.L.'s abuse accusation. At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that the 
CPS report format did not look like a format that she had seen before, but that she had seen the 
information contained in the CPS report. (R. 547 at 15, 21, 95.) 
Prior to trial, Cramer wrote counsel a letter identifying witnesses whom he believed 
would be helpful. The defense investigator gave trial counsel a written report of every witness 
he contacted. The investigator contacted every witnesses trial counsel asked him to contact, and 
counsel believed that she gave the investigator every name that Cramer provided to her. Most 
of the witnesses were character witnesses. At least two were adverse to Cramer: Linda Vraybil 
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(an adoption case worker whom Cramer admitted did not like him), and Sue Mineer (the mother 
of the two victims in the lewdness case).12 Trial counsel believed that the character witness 
testimony would have opened the door to admitting the prior guilty pleas to lewdness with Ms. 
Mineer's sons. (EL 547 at 23, 92-93.) 
Cramer apparently never identified a witness who saw Cramer with M.L. at the swimming 
pools where M.L. testified that the abuse occurred. 
B. Cramer never proved that appellate counsel overlooked an obvious ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim that probably would have succeeded. 
Cramer concludes that "it should have been obvious to appellate counsel to raise trial 
counsel's failure to investigate potential witnesses and documents." Appellant's Brief at 44. 
However, he never states why. 
In fact, Cramer never proved the obviousness element of his ineffective-assistance-of-
appellate-counsel claim. Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626, 2001 UT 96, J^48 (appellate counsel is 
ineffective only when they overlook an obvious claim that probably would have succeeded). 
Any challenges to trial counsel's investigation and use of documents and witnesses was not 
obvious from the record. The letter to trial counsel identifying witnesses, the CASA logs, and 
the CPS reports were not in the record. Trial counsel's investigation of the witnesses was not 
12Cramer's letter makes clear that he had conflicts with Vraybil. It indicated that 
Diana Warner reported to Cramer that she believed there were accuracy problems in the 
information about Cramer in the child abuse registry, but does not identify what those were. 
It identified Amy Shaffer and Lori Ferrall, indicating that they were M.L.'s UNI therapists, 
and that they would have noticed if M.L. exhibited any negative behavior. However, it 
acknowledged that, in July 1997, Ms. Ferrall offered to write a positive letter about the 
relationship between Cramer and M.L., but by September she refused to talk to him. (R. 61-
62.) Cramer has not offered any proof of what Amy Shaffer would have testified to had trial 
counsel called her as a witness. 
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in the record. Other than the subpoenas, trial counsel's investigation of the documents was not 
in the record. Cramer produced no evidence in the post-conviction hearing that he informed 
his appellate counsel about these issues. Thus, Cramer never proved that appellate counsel 
overlooked an obvious claim. By itself, that failure defeats his post-conviction claim that they 
were ineffective. 
In addition, Cramer failed to prove that his appellate counsel overlooked an ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim that probably would have succeeded. As demonstrated, 
appellate counsel would have had to prove both deficient performance and prejudice. As to the 
deficient performance, appellate counsel would have had to overcome the strong presumption 
of constitutionally acceptable representation. See Point II. Appellate counsel could not have 
challenged trial counsel's decisions made after thorough investigation. Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). 
Cramer appears to support his claim, in part, by misstating trial counsel's duty and his 
burden of proof. Cramer argues that a lawyer cannot make a strategic decision until she has 
made a "complete" investigation. Appellant's Brief at 40. The Sixth Amendment does not 
require "complete" investigation in the sense that counsel had a duty to chase down every 
potential lead. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 (2003) (the Sixth Amendment does not 
require counsel "to investigate every conceivable line of... evidence no matter how unlikely the 
effort would be to assist" the defendant).13 
13Cramer also argues that c"a decision not to investigate cannot be considered a 
tactical decision.'" Appellant's Brief at 40 (quoting State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 
1990)). He continues that a decision not to investigate is not afforded the same deference as 
a tactical decision. Id (quoting State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250,1255 (Utah 1993)). Cramer 
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Similarly, Cramer, citing 'Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct 2456 (2005), suggests that counsel 
could have demonstrated deficient performance merely by proving that there was '"room for 
debate5" about whether trial counsel "should have done better in investigating the information" 
Cramer gave them. Id at 48. Rompilla does not stand for the proposition that proving '"room 
for debate5" is sufficient to establish deficient performance. Rompilla's counsel conducted a 
very limited penalty phase investigation based on the directions Rompilla and his family gave 
her. The United States Supreme Court commented in passing that there was "room for debate" 
about whether counsel should have followed some additional lines of inquiry. Rompilla v. Beard, 
\2S S. Ct. at 2463. However, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the standards for proving deficient 
performance established in Strickland, including the requirement that the Court review counsel's 
investigation with a '"heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments.'" Id. at 2462 (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 689, 691 (1984)).14 
leaves the misleading impression that trial counsel's decision not to pursue a specific line of 
investigation is not afforded deference. 
However, Tyler clarifies that it is a decision to do no investigation at all that is not 
afforded deference. State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1255. Both Tyler and Templin rely on Strickland 
v. Washington, which adopted the deferential standard in a case where counsel cut his 
investigation short. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 672, 689-91. Thus, a decision not to 
pursue a specific line of investigation is afforded deference. 
14Cramer also claims that the Supreme Court held that Rompilla's counsel's efforts to 
interview Rompilla's family and mental health experts was not an adequate investigation. 
Appellant's Brief at 41. Cramer misstates the holding to the extent that he suggests that 
counsel, in general, may not rely on information provided by their client and the client's 
family. The Supreme Court held only that Rompilla's counsel provided inadequate 
representation because they failed to review Rompilla's prior conviction file even though she 
knew that the Commonwealth would rely on his prior convictions in support of its request 
for a death sentence. Id. at 2464-65. Had counsel done this constitutionally required 
investigation, they would have discovered that Rompilla and the other sources had 
misinformed her about the availability of other mitigation evidence. Id. at 2464-69. 
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Cramer failed to prove that appellate counsel could have established ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel under the appropriate standard. Counsel thoroughly investigated the 
witnesses Cramer identified. Counsel believed that she asked the investigator to contact all of 
the witnesses Cramer identified. The investigator contacted all of those witnesses and reported 
back to counsel. Based on the information that counsel's thorough investigation generated, trial 
counsel concluded that the witnesses would not help Cramer's case. At the post-conviction 
hearing, she recalled that at least two were hostile. The character witnesses Cramer identified 
would have opened the door to the jury hearing that Cramer pleaded guilty to lewdness with two 
other boys under circumstances similar to those M.L. described. Because trial counsel 
thoroughly investigated the witnesses Cramer identified, appellate counsel could not have 
succeeded on a challenge to her strategic decision not to call them. Strickland v. Washington^ 466 
U.S. at 690. 
Cramer's arguments in this appeal do not establish the contrary. Cramer does not 
acknowledge the correct standard. To the contrary, he asserts that his trial counsel failed "to 
follow through on leads provided by the accused." Appellant's Brief 141-42. As demonstrated, 
the record does not support that assertion. 
Cramer also argues that some of the potential witnesses would have described CASA and 
DCFS procedures and whether specific CASA entries described regular or irregular procedures. 
He also argues that some of the potential witnesses knew M.L. and "could have been used to 
challenge M.L.'s credibility." Appellant's Brief at 46. 
However, Cramer developed no evidence to support the conclusions he propounds on 
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appeal. He called none of these witnesses in the post-conviction proceedings that he claims 
could have offered this evidence. He failed to prove what CASA and DCFS procedures the 
witnesses could have described or how they would have helped undermine M.L.'s testimony that 
Cramer molested him on their swimming excursions.15 Similarly, he offered no proof that those 
witnesses would have undermined M.L.'s credibility. As stated, trial counsel recalled that at least 
two of them were hostile to the defense. Even Cramer's letter to his counsel demonstrates that 
one who initially offered support later refused to return his telephone calls (R. 61). Cramer 
failed to prove his claim. See, e.g. State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 687 (1997) (Taylor failed to 
demonstrate prejudice concerning mental health mitigation investigation when he produced 
none of the mental health evidence that he claimed that his trial counsel could have discovered), 
cert denied, 525 U.S. 833 (1998). 
Cramer also argues that appellate counsel should have relied on Templin to support a 
challenge to trial counsel's witness investigation. Templin does not control. First, Templin's 
counsel did not contact the witnesses he asked him to contact, including the witness that the 
supreme court considered critical to Templin's defense. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d at 187-89. As 
demonstrated, Cramer's counsel thoroughly investigated the witnesses Cramer identified and 
15Cramer testified that DCFS procedures required an investigation and determination 
whether an abuse allegation was substantiated or unsubstantiated. According to Cramer, this 
will either bolster the accusation or create reasonable doubt. (R. 547 at 15.) 
However, Cramer's own proffered evidence demonstrated that M.L.'s accusation was 
classified as substantiated. (R. 58, 65.) An administrative hearing resulted in changing that 
determination to "unsubstantiated," but only because DCFS was unprepared to proceed at 
the administrative hearing based on the belief that the case had been closed (R. 65-66). 
(DCFS's belief was understandable, given that the hearing occurred over three years after 
Cramer was convicted (R. 65 and 646.) Cramer never proved that any DCFS investigation 
resulted in finding that M.L.'s accusation was unsubstantiated based on the facts discovered. 
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made a strategic decision not to call them. That distinction alone would have defeated appellate 
counsel's reliance on Templin. 
In addition, Templin would not have supported a prejudice argument. In that rape case, 
both Templin and the victim agreed that they had sex; they disputed only whether the victim 
consented. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d at 184. Templin provided his counsel with names of 
witnesses who would have testified to the amount of consensual physical contact between him 
and the victim prior to the alleged rape. The most important witness saw Templin and the 
victim kissing passionately for approximately fifteen minutes before they went to the back of the 
home where they had sex. Id. at 188-89. 
Consent was not an issue in Cramer's prosecution: seven-year-old M.L. could not consent 
to Cramer touching him sexually. Cramer identified no witnesses for his trial counsel who could 
have testified about what occurred at the swimming pools where M.L. testified Cramer molested 
him. Even evidence that Cramer and M.L. appeared to get along on other occasions would not 
have rebutted M.L.'s testimony that Cramer sexually abused him at the pools. 
Cramer's claim that appellate counsel should have challenged trial counsel's investigation 
into and use of the CASA logs and CPS report is similarly meritless. Trial counsel thoroughly 
investigated the CASA logs. She subpoenaed them and reviewed them, then made a strategic 
decision not to use them. Her thorough investigation made her decision not to use them 
unchallengeable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690. That alone would have defeated 
appellate counsel's challenge to trial counsel's representation. 
In addition, Cramer provides no meaningful analysis about how appellate counsel could 
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have proven prejudice from trial counsel's decision to omit the CASA logs. He states that trial 
counsel could have used the logs to "damage[]" M.L.'s credibility, although he acknowledges that 
not all the information in the logs was "fully exculpatory." Appellant's Brief at 47. However, 
Cramer points to no specific evidence in the logs that would have damaged M.L.'s credibility. 
To the contrary, he merely concludes without analysis that the logs would have achieved this 
end. His appellate claim fails on that basis alone. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring the parties 
to support their arguments with analysis and legal authority). See State v. Honie, 57 P.2d 977,2002 
UT 4 {^61 n.7 (declining to adopt a state constitutional rule where Honie had not demonstrated 
in "any meaningful way" why the Court should apply cited constitutional provisions to create 
the proposed rule), cert denied^ 537 U.S. 863.16 
Trial counsel testified in post-conviction that she could not remember the CPS format, 
but that she knew the information in the CPS report (R. IX)}1 Cramer identifies nothing in the 
CPS reports that provided impeachment so materially different from that which the jury heard 
that it raised a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome. 
Finally, Cramer folds into his prejudice argument about the documents and witnesses the 
need for his testimony and argument that the jury would have heard "two equally plausible 
stories." As demonstrated in point II, that prejudice argument fails. 
16If Cramer intends to argue that the CASA log entries about the swimming trips 
would have damaged M.L.'s credibility because they contained no suggestion that Cramer 
molested M.L. on those trips, the claim is frivolous. Cramer prepared the logs; the fact that 
Cramer did not report that he molested M.L. would not have made M.L.'s testimony less 
credible. 
17However, she also testified that she thought the CPS report was attached to 
Detective Huggard's police report. 
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POINT V 
PRESENTING THE CASE CRAMER ARGUES HIS COUNSEL 
SHOULD HAVE PRESENTED WOULD HAVE ASSURED HIS 
CONVICTION 
Cramer argues that, even if counsel's alleged errors were individually harmless, they 
cumulatively undermine confidence in the outcome of his case. Appellant's Brief at 48-49. With 
the exception of failing to supplement the appellate record, Cramer identified no deficient 
performance.18 By itself, that failure defeats his cumulative ineffective assistance claim.19 
In any event, Cramer did not prove cumulative prejudice. To the contrary, the case he 
claims his counsel should have presented, and that he supported with evidence at the post-
conviction proceeding, would have assured his conviction. The jury would have heard 1) the 
inconsistencies in M.L.'s reports about Cramer molesting him; 2) witnesses testifying to Cramer's 
general good character; 3) witnesses testifying to Cramer's involvement in child-oriented 
community activities; 4) Cramer's explanations that he spent an extraordinary amount of time 
with MX. in order to prepare him for adoption; 5) the State emphasis that Cramer reported 
tickling M.L., cuddling with him, discussing with him the anatomical differences between boys 
and girls during one of their swimming trips, and sitting M.L. on Cramer's lap to play the flute; 
6) that DCFS classified M.L.'s abuse accusation as "substantiated"; 7) no testimony from Cramer 
denying M.L.'s accusations; and 8) that Cramer pleaded guilty to two counts of lewdness with 
18The State conceded below that failing to supplement the record amounted to 
constitutionally deficient representation (R. 225). 
19As to appellate counsel failure to supplement the record, Cramer failed to prove 
prejudice because he failed to produce the records during the post-conviction proceedings. 
See Point III. 
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two other young boys for conduct at a swimming pool. In short, rather than hearing only M.L.'s 
uncorroborated accusations with the inconsistencies in his accounts highlighted, the jury would 
have heard no denial to M.L.'s accusations and evidence that Cramer pleaded guilty to 
inappropriately touching litde boys under circumstances similar to those M.L. described. If the 
jury convicted on the case it heard, the jury certainly would have convicted on the case Cramer 
now says he wanted it to hear. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argued, the post-conviction court correcdy denied relief. The Court 
should affirm that decision. 
DATED March 8, 2006. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
THOMAS BRUNKER 
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§ 7 8 - 3 5 a - 1 0 5 . Burden of proof 
The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The respon-
dent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 
78-35a-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to 
disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 5, eff. April 29, 1996. 
§ 78—35a—106. Preclusion of relief—Exception 
(1) A" person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground 
that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction 
relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-
conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a 
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, 
if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 6, eff. April 29, 1996. 

Addendum B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERT CRAMER, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Petitioner, * CASE NO. 020908139 
vs. : 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Respondent. : 
This matter is before the Court on petitioner's claim that 
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on appeal a 
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, 
petitioner claims that appellate counsel should have argued that 
trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to obtain records of 
Det. Huggard, Kyle Cook and Linda Vraybill and using the records to 
impeach the victim's testimony; (2) failing to investigate and call 
various additional defense witnesses; (3) failing to use 
petitioner's CASA (Court Appointed Special Advocate) logs to 
impeach the victim's testimony; and (4) denying petitioner his 
right to testify. 
Post-conviction writs may be used to attack a judgment or 
conviction only on the grounds that an obvious injustice or 
substantial denial of a constitutional right occurred at trial. 
Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989) (citations 
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omitted) . A petitioner may not raise an issue by means of a post-
conviction writ that should have been raised on appeal. Id. 
(Citations omitted.) However, a petitioner may raise the issue of 
ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time under Utah's 
Post-Conviction Relief Act, Utah Code Ann., Section 78-35a-101, et 
seq. (1953 as amended), if he was represented by the same counsel 
at both the trial and on appeal. Rudolph v. Galetka, 43 P.3d 4 67 
(Utah 2 002) . "When trial counsel represents [a] defendant on 
appeal an ineffective assistance claim cannot be raised because it 
is unreasonable to expect [trial counsel] to raise the issue of her 
own ineffectiveness at trial on direct appeal." Id. at 468-469 
(citations omitted.) In all other cases failure to raise that 
issue on direct appeal results in a waiver of that claim. Pasgual 
v. Carver, 876 P.2d 364, 366 (Utah 1994); Utah Code Ann., Section 
78-35a-104 (1) (d) and 106(1) (4) . Such is the case here. Petitioner 
was represented by Gregory Skordas and Stephanie Ames on appeal, 
and Kimberly Clark and John D. O'Connell, Jr., at trial. The issue 
of ineffective assistance of counsel should have been raised on 
appeal. 
Relying on State v. Archambeau, 820 P. 2d 920 (Utah App. 1991), 
petitioner argues that in certain "exceptional circumstances," 
specifically because his claim involves a "liberty interest," this 
Court can address a claim such as his for the first time through a 
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post-conviction writ. In Archambeau, defendant argued that a 
threat to his "liberty interest" alone was sufficient to raise a 
constitutional issue for the first time on appeal. The Court 
rejected his reasoning, noting that because virtually every 
criminal appeal involves a "liberty interest," to adopt a per se 
"liberty interest" exception "would effectively swallow the general 
rule in criminal appeals." .Id. at 925. The court concluded that 
a "liberty interest'1 claim was merely one factor to be considered 
in its determination of the presence of "exceptional 
circumstances." Although somewhat helpful, Archambeau is not 
directly applicable to the instant case. There, defendant's case 
was on direct appeal; here petitioner has filed a post-conviction 
(and post-appeal) writ. 
The Utah Supreme Court has given clear direction regarding 
circumstances when an issue may be raised for the first time 
through a post-conviction writ. In Carter v. Galetka, 44 P. 3d 626, 
633 (Utah 2001), the court reiterated its standard that "if the 
contention of error is something which is known or should be known 
to the party at the time the judgment was entered, it must be 
reviewed in the...regular prescribed procedure, or the judgment 
becomes final and is not subject to further attack, except in 
unusual circumstances." (Emphasis added) (quoting Brown v. Turner, 
440 P.2d 968, 969 (1968)). "To demonstrate unusual circumstances, 
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a petitioner must show that there was an obvious injustice or a 
substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right....'" 
(Quoting Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035 (Utah 1989).) 
None of petitioner's first three claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, that counsel failed to obtain records, 
failed to investigate and call additional witnesses and failed to 
use CASA logs for impeachment do not constitute "unusual 
circumstances" warranting initial review in this Petition. 
Petitioner argues that his final claim, that trial counsel failed 
to apprise petitioner of his constitutional right to testify, 
constitutes a "denial" of this constitutional right that 
"irreversibly tainted" the trial justifying reversal. He has not 
claimed that the government interfered with that right. As noted 
by the State, courts have been reluctant to characterize an 
attorney's alleged failure to advise a defendant of his right to 
testify as a constitutional defect, preferring to characterize the 
issue as one of ineffective assistance of counsel subject to a 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), analysis. See, 
e.g., United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1992) . This 
Court agrees. The issue ordinarily should have been raised on 
appeal under an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
At an evidentiary hearing on this matter, petitioner and two 
trial defense attorneys testified on the issue of petitioners not 
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testifying at trial. Petitioner stated that he was told by one 
attorney that she would "step on his neck" if he chose to testify 
(apparently constituting advice not to testify), and did not inform 
him he had a constitutional right to do so. Ms. Clark testified 
that she advised petitioner not to testify, explaining to him that 
his prior conviction of lewdness involving another young boy would 
come in and be very prejudicial. She did not recall petitioner 
ever saying he wanted to testify and denied threatening him with 
physical violence. Mr. O'Connell recalled advising petitioner not 
to testify, did not remember whether petitioner wanted to testify 
and could not remember whether or not petitioner was told he had 
that constitutional right. This Court finds that petitioner's 
testimony concerning his attorneys1 threats are not credible, that 
assertion alone raising an issue of the credibility of the rest of 
his testimony. Looking at Ms. Clark's and Mr. O'Connell's 
testimonies as a whole, the Court finds that the issue of 
petitioner testifying at trial was thoroughly covered by counsel. 
Accordingly, this Court finds no "unusual circumstances," 
constituting either "prejudicial denial of petitioner's 
constitutional right," or "obvious injustice" warranting post-
conviction relief. Therefore, petitioner is procedurally barred 
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from raising the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
through a post-conviction writ and denies his Petition. 
Dated this /<f" day of July, 
•Sift 
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